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Abstract
Empirically, stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that (i) loan rates
and deposit rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate, (ii) loan rates exceed
the policy rate less, and (iii) deposit rates undercut the policy rate more. I find that
a New Keynesian model with monopolistically competitive banks can account for
the first two of these empirical facts. The model predicts that increased competition
in the banking sector reduces the spread between the steady-state policy rate and
the loan rate. Furthermore, augmented competition among banks amplifies the
pass-through of monetary policy to the real economy.
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1 Introduction
Despite the fact that commercial banks are the scapegoats of the deep financial crisis
which started in August 2007 and persists to this day, their importance in the clearing
up must not be forgotten, now. Ju¨rgen Stark, Member of the Executive Board and
the Governing Council of the ECB, emphasises that “In contrast to other regions, the
banking sector plays an important role in the transmission process of monetary policy
impulses in the euro area.”1.
Hence, this paper continues the consideration of banking and interest rates in mone-
tary policy analysis by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), extending their work in an
important direction. In my model, the products of two different banks are imperfect
substitutes. Like price-making goods producers, commercial banks can thus determine
the interest rate they pay on deposits and the rate they demand on loans.
At the same time, it is a first attempt to develop a micro-founded general equilibrium
model that is able to reproduce a few empirically observed features related to private
banking. Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) analyse the impact of loan market competition
on bank rates in the euro area between 1994 and 2004. They find evidence that stronger
competition implies lower interest differentials between bank and market rates for most
loan products, while banks seem to compensate for this by increasing the spread on
current and deposit accounts. Furthermore, the responsiveness of bank rates to changes
in market interest rates is positively correlated with the extent of competition.
The introduction of interest-rate rigidity into a New Keynesian DSGE model with a
banking sector has two implications. In the long run, monopolistic competition among
banks leads to an under-provision of deposits and credit contracts relative to a perfect
competition scenario. As a consequence, steady-state economic activity decreases.
In the short run, imperfect pass-through from the policy rate to deposit and loan rates
affects the fluctuations of real variables. Banks with deposit rate setting power amplify
the responses to unforeseen monetary disturbances. Sluggish adjustment of deposit rates
enhances any change in the opportunity cost of consumption and thus the behaviour of
output, consumption, and employment at business cycle frequencies.
On the contrary, banks that control the loan rate have a moderating effect on the fluc-
1Translated from a speech delivered in German at the Franz-Bo¨hm-Kolleg, Siegen, April 29th 2009
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tuations in real variables. Imperfect adjustment of loan rates cushions the deviations of
investment and employment from their respective steady-states. The loan market effect
clearly dominates the deposit market effect.
Overall, monopolistic competition among private banks can thus be considered a sig-
nificant bottleneck in this model. It attenuates the efficiency of monetary policy. My
theoretical results imply the same policy suggestions as the empirical findings by van Leu-
vensteijn et al. (2008). Structural reforms that enforce competition among the providers
of financial services are likely to promote long-run economic activity and seem to improve
the pass-through of central bank policy measures to the real economy.
Building on Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), my model evolves from an economy with
a goods-producing and a banking sector. Firms use labour and capital to produce a
diversified output good which is sold in a monopolistically competitive market. They
cannot retain earnings, but accumulate productive capital through investment. Returns
accrue at the end of period, while the wage bill and investment are paid up front. Firms
must therefore finance their production costs by a one-period bank loan.
Commercial banks provide two types of financial intermediation. To produce loans, they
combine collateral, consisting of a borrower’s productive capital stock and end-of-period
profits, with monitoring effort. Since monitoring is costly, banks demand an external
finance premium (EFP) on top of the risk-free reference rate.
Moreover, banks take deposits from private households. Due to administrative costs,
these accounts pay a return below that of a risk-free asset. Nevertheless, households
hold deposits, as they face a deposit-in-advance constraint. Accordingly, I refer to this
interest rate differential as the liquidity premium or inside money premium (IMP).
Financial contracts are heterogeneous between banks. This generates an imperfectly
competitive market pattern, where banks expand the spread between the reference rate
and the interest rate on deposit and loans, respectively, beyond the costs of provision.
This paper focuses on the particularities of a monopolistically competitive banking sector
with endogenous costs of deposit and loan provision. Allowing financial intermediaries
to set the respective interest rates, subject to quadratic adjustment costs a` la Rotemberg
(1982), I add a micro-founded imperfection to the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy and generalise the theoretical findings in Scharler (2008).
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I give a short overview of
the recent related literature. Section 3 introduces the main actions and timing as well
as the agents of my model economy. In section 4, I derive the intertemporally optimal
behaviour of agents and the symmetric equilibrium. The calibration of parameters and
steady-state results are presented in section 5. In section 6, I analyse the reactions
of selected variables to the 5 different shocks, and perform a sensitivity analysis of
impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock with respect to the bank
competition parameters. Section 7 concludes.
2 Review of the Recent Related Literature
The past decade has bred an enormous amount of research trying to reproduce the
qualitative and quantitative features of business cycles and to evaluate the potential
of monetary policy in steering economic activity. Recent theoretical approaches use
micro-founded models based on intertemporally optimising agents whose decisions are
subjected to budget or other constraints and affected by various types of exogenous
shocks.2 Popular examples of these state-of-the-art DSGE models are discussed in Wood-
ford (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
However, the fact that most models are fundamentally non-monetary remains indeed a
reason for unease, as Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) put it. In the light of the cur-
rent financial crisis which spilled over to the real economy, a standard framework with-
out broad monetary aggregates, commercial banks or endogenous interest rates seems
increasingly incomplete.
Opponent authors like Woodford (2003) in his celebrated volume Interest and Prices,
Ireland (2004), or Woodford (2009) suggest that money plays a minimal role in the
business cycle, at best. Yet, these contributions do not incorporate any kind of credit
market imperfection.
Consequently, this paper follows prior research to implement a banking sector in an
otherwise standard DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. It is thus an attempt
to continue a line of work that includes Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1995), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Ireland
2Many economists have agreed upon what Goodfriend and King (1997) call The New Neoclassical
Synthesis.
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(2003), Goodfriend (2005), and more recently Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), Stracca
(2007), as well as Gerali et al. (2008, 2009). While all these studies set out to illuminate
“the black box” of the credit channel, Ireland (2003) is the first to incorporate a demand
for money that facilitates transactions.
Goodfriend (2005) pursues the distinction between narrow money, made up of currency
and bank reserves, and broad money, including bank deposits and highly liquid assets.
The former accommodates automatically when monetary policy targets the interest rate.
According to the author, broad money must not be ignored either in a model destined
to guide monetary policy.
The approach is rendered dynamical in the subsequent paper by Goodfriend and McCal-
lum (2007). In their model, the provision of loans requires collateral as well as monitoring
effort. At the same time, broad money or bank deposits are required for transactions.
Accordingly, the authors identify two opposing effects of an explicit banking sector: On
the one hand, the well-known “financial accelerator”, resulting from a drop in the value
of collateral under adverse economic conditions. This increases the EFP and intensifies
the responses to a given initial disturbance. On the other hand a “banking attenuator”
which arises from the tendency of consumption to fall during recession, lowering thereby
the demand for bank deposits. This redirects part of the borrowers’ net worth into
collateral-eligible assets and reduces the EFP.
3 The Model
The economic environment contains five types of agents: A representative private house-
hold, a representative final goods producer, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing
firms, a continuum of financial intermediaries, and a monetary authority. Time t is dis-
crete.
At the beginning of every period, intermediate goods producers take out a loan from one
of the private banks to hire labour and to invest into new capital which is productive
as of period t+1. With the borrowed funds, firms produce a differentiated intermediate
output that is traded in a monopolistically competitive market.
Banks produce these loans from two substitutable input factors: labour to screen and
monitor borrowers and collateral. Since only monitoring is costly, more collateral reduces
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the cost of providing a loan and thus the loan interest rate demanded by the bank.
A representative final goods producer combines the continuum of intermediate goods to
a final good that can be invested by firms or consumed by the household. The market for
final output is perfectly competitive and the representative final goods producer earns
zero profit.
The central bank’s monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule. It provides private
banks with high-powered money in exchange for risk-free bank bonds. The latter yield
an interest equal to the central bank-determined policy rate.
A representative household supplies two types of homogeneous labour - work and mon-
itoring effort - to firms and banks. It earns the same real wage in both sectors. A
deposit-in-advance constraint forces households to support a share of consumption ex-
penditure with deposits.
Imperfectly competitive agents extract a monopolistic rent which is redistributed to the
owner, the representative household, as a dividend at the end of period. Likewise, the
central bank transfers its seignorage proceeds to the private household. These resources
are also consumed or saved for future periods in the form of deposits and to provide
liquidity services.
3.1 The Representative Household
The infinitely-lived representative household derives utility from final goods consumption
ct and from the consumption of leisure time. It maximises discounted lifetime utility
Et
∞∑
v=0
βvUt+v, where Ut = ln ct − φ(nt + st). (1)
Above, β is the private discount factor. nt and st are the shares of total time endowment,
normalised to 1, the household spends working in the firm and the bank, respectively.3
Due to asymmetric information in the consumer market, the final goods producer re-
quires an evidence of solvency before delivery. Thus, households must secure an exoge-
nously varying share of consumption by bank deposits d. This additional restriction
is implemented by means of a deposit-in-advance (DIA) constraint in the sense of a
standard cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint.
3Accordingly, 1−nt −st measures the consumption of leisure. Its natural logarithm is approximately
−(nt + st).
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Consumption expenditure is financed out of labour income and dividends - distributed
either by firms or banks - seignorage proceeds transferred by the central bank, or private
saving. The latter either takes the form of deposit accounts at a bank or of financial
investment in the risk-free bond b. Household income that has not been consumed, can
be saved in either asset to raise private wealth. Maximisation is thus subjected to the
budget constraint,
ct + bt + dt + φd2 ( dtdt−1 − 1)
2
dt−1 ≤ wt(nt + st) + dt−1Rdt−1
πt
+ bt−1Rt−1
πt
+ gt + gft + gcbt , (2)
on the one hand, and to the deposit-in-advance constraint, αtct ≤ dt, on the other hand.
The DIA constraint embeds a mean reverting AR(1) process, αt = ρααt−1+(1−ρα)α+αt ,
that swings around a long-run share of consumption α to be guaranteed by deposits.
Therefore, d must be considered as an aggregate including both sight deposits and cash.
αt is a Gaussian white noise disturbance.
Apart from their necessity in a share of consumption purchases, bank-deposited funds
yield a gross return Rd. Any change in the amount of d gives rise to quadratic adjustment
costs. The representative household maximises its lifetime utility subject to the above
constraints by determining an infinite series of optimal levels of {ct, nt, bt, dt}.
3.2 Monopolistically Competitive Intermediate Goods-Producing Firms
The continuum of intermediate goods producers is indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Hiring homo-
geneous labour n(i) from the representative household, firm i produces a differentiated
intermediate good y(i), using a common constant returns to scale technology. Selling
output in an imperfectly competitive market, intermediate goods producers earn a pos-
itive monopolistic profit.
The accumulation of productive physical capital, and therefore all investment decisions,
is in the hands of the firm. The capital accumulation equation takes the usual deter-
ministic form, kt(i) = (1 − δ)kt−1(i) + it(i) , where it(i) is gross investment into capital
undertaken by firm i in period t. Production is described by the Cobb-Douglas function
yt(i) = eθtkt−1(i)γnt(i)1−γ , where θt = ρθθt−1 + θt is a persistent disturbance to total
factor productivity, with θt white noise. Note that the period t capital stock of a firm,
which consists of the depreciated kt−1 and recently undertaken investment, will not be
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productive before the beginning of period t+1.
Intermediate goods producers rely on bank loans to finance their current costs up front.
In real terms, firm i must borrow an amount
Lt(i)
Pt
= Wt
Pt
nt(i) + Qt
Pt
it(i). (3)
For simplicity, I fix the typically pro-cyclical market price of capital QtPt = qt to unity
in my model. Final consumption and investment goods are identical, and so are their
prices. This largely switches off the “financial accelerator” in the sense of Bernanke
et al. (1996). Still, the value of collateral, the demand for monitoring effort, and the
EFP remain subject to changes in a firm’s stock of physical capital and expected profits
- two generally pro-cyclical quantities likely to amplify impulse responses. Note that
this assumption is not a requirement for solving the model. A market price for capital
can be derived by adding a representative capital goods producer who transforms the
depreciated old capital stock and final output into new productive capital in a costly
investment process.4
In equilibrium, default on debt obligations is not an option for firms. The screening ac-
tivities of commercial banks exclude any would-be borrowers from the loan market right
from the start. This avoids cases of bankruptcy among intermediate-goods producers.5
All firms are owned by the representative household and do not accumulate own funds,
apart from the stock of productive capital. At the end of each period, monopolistic
profits g are therefore distributed to the household. The risk-neutral manager of firm i
chooses optimal values of {nt(i), Pt(i), kt(i)} to maximise
Et
∞∑
v=0
βvλt+vgt+v(i), (4)
4Another version of the model which includes this extension, replicates the “financial accelerator”
phenomenon of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1999), without, however, influencing
the conclusions drawn from the introduction of monopolistically competitive banks. I therefore omit it
in the present paper.
5This short cut is adopted from Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) who refer to Kocherlakota (1996).
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where real current firm profits are given by
gt(i) =Pt(i)
Pt
yt(i) − Rlt−1(wt−1(i)nt−1(i) + it−1(i))
πt
− φp
2
( Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1)
2
yt(i) − φk2 ( kt(i)kt−1(i) − 1)
2
kt−1(i),
(5)
subject to satisfying demand for intermediate good i by the final goods producer:
eθtkt−1(i)γnt(i)1−γ ≥ (Pt(i)
Pt
)−μ yt = yt(i). (6)
In the instantaneous profit function, Rl is the per period gross loan rate demanded by
banks. I assume that monopolistically competitive firms face quadratic adjustment costs
when resetting their prices6 and when adjusting the stock of physical capital. Note that
the presence of capital adjustment costs implies a value of installed productive capital
to the firm that may well lie above q which has been normalised to unity. As intuition
suggests, both price and capital adjustment cost are zero in the stationary equilibrium.
3.3 The Representative Final Goods-Producing Firm
The final goods producer operates in a perfectly competitive market, purchasing y(i)
units of the intermediate good i at the price P(i) and assembling these inputs in the
usual Dixit-Stiglitz way to produce the final good
yt = ⎛⎜⎝
1
∫
0
yt(i)μ−1μ di⎞⎟⎠
μ
μ−1
, (7)
where μ is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods of different pro-
ducers. The profit-maximising demand of the final goods producer for the intermediate
good i is thus yt(i) = (Pt(i)Pt )−μ yt, with an aggregate price index Pt = (∫ 10 Pt(i)1−μdi)
1
1−μ .
6The deferred repayment of working capital loans overly complicates the computation of an ex-
pression for real marginal costs. I therefore preferred quadratic price adjustment costs according to
Rotemberg (1982) to the more popular price stickiness a` la Calvo (1983). Note that both approaches de-
liver equivalent optimal price-setting behaviour of monopolistically competitive goods producers, which
has been proven e.g. by Roberts (1995).
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3.4 Monopolistically Competitive Financial Intermediaries
Commercial banks, indexed by j ∈ [0,1], provide slightly differentiated products of finan-
cial intermediation. They face a constant finite elasticity of substitution in the market
for deposits and loans, respectively. In line with Gerali et al. (2008, 2009), I assume
that bank clients demand a Dixit-Stiglitz composite of the above differentiated contracts.
Formally, this means that the representative household must divide its deposit holdings
across the entire continuum of banks. Similarly, firms must sign loan contracts with every
single bank j in order to borrow one unit of external funds. This approach lacks realistic
micro-foundations, but it incorporates all the features necessary for analysing the impact
of bank competition on the pass-through of monetary policy.7 The responsiveness of a
bank’s share in the composite deposit and loan contract to the corresponding interest
rate depends inversely on the parameters ηd and ηl. When resetting their interest rates,
banks face Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs. Similar to the case of a price-setting
firm, the latter should be considered as “menu costs”. In particular, they include any
resource costs related to communicating the new interest rates to clients.
Bank j produces loans according to the CRS function
lt(j) = F (gt + qkt)σ(eχtst(j))1−σ, (8)
where monitoring effort st, supplied by the representative household, is the only costly
input factor. I assume that all banks are of comparable size and have an identical
number of clients. The latter are distributed randomly across financial institutions. As
a consequence, the monitoring required to provide a line of credit l(j) depends inversely
on the economy-wide collateral.8
On the one hand, this collateral consists of current period profits which are only dis-
tributed to the household, if the firm honours its debt. On the other hand, the bank can
seize the borrower’s capital stock in the event of default which is excluded in this model.
7Approaches with a richer economic content are taken e.g. by Andre´s and Arce (2008). They use a
version of Salop’s (1979) circular city to model imperfect competition in the loan market, where borrowers
suffer a utility cost when travelling to a bank. Aliaga-Dı´az and Oliveiro (2007) introduce switching costs
a` la Klemperer (1995) as a source of market power. These costs lead to a bank client “lock-in” effect.
8While an influence of firm-specific collateral on the cost of external funding seems more realistic, I
made this modelling choice to avoid feedback from the loan interest rate into a firm’s optimal investment
and production decisions. In the symmetric equilibrium, the assumption of economy-wide collateral is
entirely unproblematic.
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Since k is installed in the firm, only a constant fraction q < 1 is considered actually
collectible by the bank.9 χt = ρχχt−1 + χt is an auto-correlated innovation to monitoring
technology, in the following referred to as external finance premium shock or EFP shock,
with χt i.i.d. normal.
In addition, bank j provides deposits to the household. The associated costs ωtdt(j)mt(j)
rise with the amount of d and fall in the bank’s reserves of central bank money. Banks
expand their reserves mt(j) by engaging in an open market operation. They issue a risk-
free bond b which is bought by the monetary authority in exchange for high-powered
money. The mean-reverting marginal cost ωt = ρωωt−1+(1−ρω)ω+ωt is not bank-specific.
It fluctuates around a long-run average value of ω, disturbed by a white noise shock ωt ,
later on referred to as the inside money premium shock or IMP shock.
Private banks have access to the open or interbank market, where they can borrow at
the risk-free rate R. They will thus not agree to pay a return on sight deposits above the
risk-free rate, corrected for the cost of deposit provision. The difference between Rt and
Rdt is a liquidity premium. I call it the inside money premium (IMP), in what follows.
The risk-neutral manager of bank j sets {dt(j), st(j), bt(j),mt(j),Rdt (j),Rlt(j)} to max-
imise
Et
∞∑
v=0
βvλt+vg
f
t+v(j), (9)
where instantaneous profits are
gft (j) =dt(j) + bt(j) + mt−1(j)πt +
lt−1(j)Rlt−1(j)
πt
− dt−1(j)Rdt−1(j)
πt
− bt−1(j)Rt−1(j)
πt
− lt(j) −mt(j) −wtst(j) − ωtdt(j)
mt(j)
− φRd
2
( Rdt (j)
Rdt−1(j) − 1)
2
dt(j) − φRl2 ( R
l
t(j)
Rlt−1(j) − 1)
2
lt(j),
(10)
subject to dt(j) ≥ (Rdt (j)Rdt )
ηd
dt and lt(j) ≥ (Rlt(j)Rlt )
−ηl
lt. As in Henzel et al. (2009), each
bank faces a downward-sloping demand curve for loan contracts and an upward-sloping
demand curve for deposit accounts. The above expressions derive from a cost-minimising
9The real market price of the uninstalled physical capital would again be equal to 1, as it is identical
in its characteristics to the final output good.
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borrowing behaviour of intermediate goods producers and from the DIA-constrained
utility maximisation of the representative household, respectively.
3.5 The Monetary Authority
I do not model a government or any kind of fiscal policy in this paper. Yet, I introduce
an authority exercising monetary policy. Its highly stylised balance sheet only contains
high-powered money m on the liabilities side and bank bonds b on the asset side.
Every period, the monetary authority conducts open market operations to provide com-
mercial banks with their desired amount of central bank money in exchange for risk-free
bank bonds. Since its assets b yield a return, while its liability m doesn’t, the central
bank retains a positive seignorage profit from open market operations:
gcbt =mt + bt−1Rt−1πt − bt −
mt−1
πt
. (11)
To avoid that these proceeds are lost to the economy, I assume that they are transferred
to the representative household as an additional source of non-labour income.
Monetary policy follows a simple version of the standard Taylor (1993) rule:
Rt = (1 − ρ)(β−1 +ϕπ(πt − 1)) + ρRt−1 + Rt . (12)
The risk-free gross nominal interest rate adjusts to offset any deviations of current in-
flation from its target value.10 In a stationary environment, it is reasonable to assume
that the central bank targets strict price stability, i.e. a zero inflation rate. The rule
also incorporates interest rate inertia, capturing a strong aversion to fluctuations in the
policy instrument (0 < ρ < 1).
The Taylor principle for stability is fulfilled, if the central bank raises the real interest
rate in response to an inflationary shock. This holds when ϕπ > 1. The white noise
shock Rt cannot be controlled by the monetary authority. It prevents an exact pursuit
of the policy rule.
10Alternative Taylor rules, e.g. embedding a reaction to the so-called output gap, do not change
neither qualitative nor quantitative results significantly, as long as empirically reasonable values for the
monetary policy parameters are chosen.
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4 Intertemporal Optimisation of Agents
4.1 Household Utility Maximisation
The first order conditions (FOCs), resulting from the representative household’s optimi-
sation problem, with respect to its choice variables are:
1
ct
= λt + ξtαt (13)
φ = λtwt (14)
λt = βEtλt+1 Rt
πt+1
(15)
(1 + φd ( dt
dt−1
− 1))λt = βEtλt+1 [φd (dt+1
dt
− 1) dt+1
dt
− φd
2
(dt+1
dt
− 1)2]
+ βEtλt+1 Rdt
πt+1
+ ξt. (16)
Together with the DIA constraint, these 4 equations determine optimal household be-
haviour.
4.2 Profit Maximisation of Intermediate Goods Producers
The corresponding FOCs of the monopolistically competitive firms are:
βEt
λt+1
πt+1
Rltwt = (1 − γ)Ξt(i) yt(i)nt(i) (17)
(1 − μ)λt + μΞt(i) + μλtφp2 (πtπ − 1)
2 =
λtφp (πt
π
− 1) πt
π
− βEtλt+1φp (πt+1
π
− 1) πt+1
π
yt+1
yt
(18)
β2Etλt+2
Rlt+1(1 − δ)
πt+2
+ βγEtΞt+1(i) yt+1
kt(i) = −βEtλt+1φk (
kt+1(i)
kt(i) − 1)
kt+1(i)
kt(i)
+βEtλt+1φk2 (kt+1(i)kt(i) − 1)
2 − βEtλt+1 Rlt
πt+1
+ λtφk ( kt(i)
kt−1(i) − 1) .(19)
These conditions are completed by the capital accumulation equation and the Cobb-
Douglas production function.
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4.3 Profit Maximisation of Financial Intermediaries
The optimal behaviour of private banks is prescribed by the following equations:
βEt
λt+1
λt
Rdt (j)
πt+1
+ ωt
mt(j) − 1 =
λ1t (j)
λt
− φRd
2
( Rdt (j)
Rdt−1(j) − 1)
2
(20)
1 = βEtλt+1
λt
Rt
πt+1
(21)
βEt
λt+1
λt
Rlt(j)
πt+1
+ λ2t (j)
λt
− 1 = wtst(j)(1 − σ)lt(j) +
φRl
2
( Rlt(j)
Rlt−1(j) − 1)
2
(22)
βEt
λt+1
λt
1
πt+1
= 1 − ωtdt(j)
mt(j)2 . (23)
By combining (20) and (21), we receive an expression for the inside money premium, i.e.
the spread between the risk-free interest rate and the return on deposits at bank j.
IMPt ∶ Et βπt+1 λt+1λt (Rt −Rdt (j)) = ωtmt(j) − λ1t (j)λt + φRd2 ( Rdt (j)Rdt−1(j) − 1)
2
This interest differential is determined by the marginal cost of deposit provision (the first
term on the right hand side), the marginal cost in terms of household utility of a loss of
clients who dissolve their accounts at the bank (the second term on the right hand side)
and quadratic interest rate adjustment costs (the third term on the right hand side).
Equivalently, we may substitute from (21) into the first-order condition w.r.t. moni-
toring (22) to obtain an expression for the external finance premium. It quantifies the
opportunity cost of firms when relying on bank loans, i.e. external funds.
EFPt ∶ Et βπt+1 λt+1λt (Rlt(j) −Rt) = wtst(j)(1−σ)lt(j) − λ2t (j)λt + φRl2 ( Rlt(j)Rlt−1(j) − 1)
2
The meaning of the right hand side terms is corresponding: The marginal cost of an
additional unit of monitoring effort, the change in utility terms of a gain or loss in loan
market share, and the quadratic costs of adjusting the loan interest rate. I finally merge
the FOCs w.r.t. m (23) and b to derive an explicit demand for central bank money:
Et
β
πt+1
λt+1
λt
(Rt − 1) = ωtdt(j)
mt(j)2 ⇔ mt(j) =
 ωtdt(j)
β(Rt − 1)Et( 1πt+1 )
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In open market operations, commercial banks have no influence on the policy rate.
Neither do they face adjustment costs. The difference between the risk-free interest rate
and the return on high-powered money is thus determined by the marginal product of
m in deposit provision. More intuitively, bank j demands reserves until the r.h.s. equals
the net monetary policy rate
These optimality conditions are completed by the loan production function and the firm’s
credit requirement. I thus assume that demand for loans is satisfied in equilibrium.
In similar form, the above expressions also arise in a framework with fully competitive
banks. Monopolistic competition among private banks adds two new decision variables.
Deposit and loan interest rates are set in the face of adjustment costs and of a propor-
tional loss of clients. Accordingly, the optimal values of Rdt and R
l
t, respectively, must
fulfil the following first-order conditions:
λtηd (Rdt (j)
Rdt
)ηd−1 dt
Rdt
− βEtλt+1(1 + ηd) dt
πt+1
(Rdt (j)
Rdt
)ηd − λtηd (Rdt (j)
Rdt
)ηd−1 ωtdt
mt(j)Rdt
− λtφRd ( Rdt (j)
Rdt−1(j) − 1)(
Rdt (j)
Rdt
)ηd dt
Rdt−1(j) + βEtλt+1φRd (
Rdt+1(j)
Rdt (j) − 1)(
Rdt+1(j)
Rdt+1
)ηd Rdt+1(j)
Rdt (j)2 dt+1
− λtηdφRd2 ( R
d
t (j)
Rdt−1(j) − 1)
2 (Rdt (j)
Rdt
)ηd−1 dt
Rdt
− λ1t ηd (Rdt (j)
Rdt
)ηd−1 = 0 (24)
βEtλt+1(1 − ηl) lt
πt+1
(Rlt(j)
Rlt
)−ηl + λtηl (Rlt(j)
Rlt
)−ηl−1 lt
Rlt
− λtφRl ( Rlt(j)
Rlt−1(j))(
Rlt(j)
Rlt
)−ηl lt
Rlt−1(j) + βEtλt+1φRl (
Rlt+1(j)
Rlt(j) − 1)(
Rlt+1(j)
Rlt+1
)−ηl Rlt+1(j)
Rlt(j)2 lt+1
+ λtηlφRl2 ( R
l
t(j)
Rlt−1(j) − 1)
2 (Rlt(j)
Rlt
)−ηl−1 lt
Rlt
+ λ2t ηl (Rlt(j)
Rlt
)−ηl−1 lt
Rlt
= 0 (25)
It is straightforward to simplify these equations, dividing by the marginal utility of
household consumption, λt, and by the economy-wide average levels of sight deposits,
dt, and loan contracts, lt, as well as multiplying them by Rdt and R
l
t, respectively.
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4.4 The Symmetric Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is an infinite sequence of the endogenous model variables,
where all economic agents optimise, the central bank follows its Taylor rule, and goods
as well as financial contract markets clear.
I assume that the representative household holds zero bonds in equilibrium and accumu-
lates financial wealth only in terms of bank deposits. Apart from that, the equilibrium
conditions of the household and the monetary authority basically replicate their FOCs.
The same is true for the monopolistically competitive firms and banks.
Although the latter two agents profit from quantifiable market power which allows each
firm i to set its price and each bank j to set its interest rates independently, I assume
symmetric behaviour in the following. Facing the same economic state and only aggre-
gate innovations11 , their factor demand and price-setting decisions will be identical in
equilibrium. Under the above symmetry assumptions, I receive a system of 23 equations
contained in Appendix A.
5 Calibration and Steady-State Analysis
From the equations in Appendix A, it is straightforward to derive the stationary equi-
librium. I assume that no random shocks occur in the steady state, so that Rt = 0
and the exogenous variables αt, θt, χt, ωt adopt their long-run trend values α, θ, χ, ω.
These are partially equal to zero. Due to the nonlinear nature of the model, a closed
form analytical solution is not available. Instead, it is solved numerically by means of
the Gauss-Newton method using Matlab routines. As far as possible, I calibrate the
parameter set according to the existing literature. When it comes to banking-related
parameters, prior sources of information are rare. The calibration is thus geared to gen-
erate empirically relevant steady-state values of the key financial variables - especially
bank interest rates and spreads.
5.1 Choice of Parameter Values
The household discount factor β is set to a quarterly value of 0.9951 to match the
average inflation-adjusted Effective Federal Funds Rate between 1985 and 2009. This
11Remember that the model does not incorporate idiosyncratic shocks to any of the economic agents.
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corresponds to a real annual policy rate of just below 2%. With a weight of leisure
φ = 2.14 in the utility function, the representative household spends one third of its
total time endowment working in either firms or banks. On average, the household must
secure 80% of consumption by bank deposits (α = 0.8).
I set the income share of capital in goods production γ to a standard value of 0.35.
Productive capital depreciates with a quarterly rate δ of 2.5%. A price elasticity of
intermediate good demand μ = 6 implies a steady-state monopolistic mark-up of 20%
over marginal costs.
Collateral is relatively more efficient in loan production than in goods production. The
higher a borrower’s guarantee, the less informational effort must be invested by banks
to provide a given amount of credit and to ensure its repayment. Without collateral, no
loans can be produced, at all. Similar to Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), I set σ, the
contribution of collateral in the loan production function, equal to 0.6.
Installed physical capital is considered recoverable and marketable only to an extent q
of 21%. A constant TFP in loan production F = 6 completes the set of loan-related
parameters. They are calibrated to the average value of the US Prime Lending Rate
between 1985 and 2009.
The long-run equilibrium value of the deposit interest rate is highly sensitive to the
marginal administration cost. To obtain reasonable steady-state differentials, ω is kept
very low.12
I finally calibrate the interest-rate elasticity of deposit and loan demand, ηd and ηl. For
these parameters which are not yet well-established in the New Keynesian literature,
the sole source of reference is Gerali et al. (2008, 2009). Setting ηd = 500 and ηl =
400, I implicitly assume that in a world with both heterogeneous firms and banks, the
financial contracts provided by different banks can be substituted much easier than the
consumption or investment goods of different firms. As a consequence, firms enjoy more
market power than banks. They demand thus a bigger mark-up over marginal costs.
The proper value of these last parameters is the most obvious source of vagueness in my
calibration. I do not claim to set a benchmark, here, at all.
12Increasing the parameter ω easily leads to a negative real interest rate paid on household deposit.
Although this is imaginable when considering nominal interest rates on checking or overnight deposit
accounts and correcting for inflation, I choose a calibration with positive steady-state real return on all
financial assets.
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5.2 The Stationary Equilibrium
As announced in the introduction to this chapter, the model is now solved numerically.
Under the above parameterisation, I obtain the steady-state values listed in table 1.
Several intuitive results follow directly. With a value of 2.42, the annual capital-output
ratio is low but in an acceptable range. A consumption-to-GDP ratio c/y of 0.757 and
an investment-to-GDP ratio i/y of 0.242 indicate that household consumption and firm
investment absorb the lion’s share of output, but not all. 0.1% of GDP is spent on the
administration of deposits. These costs are sunk and not redistributed to bank employees
in the form of wages or to the owners of deposits as interest payment. Remember that
this is not the case in loan production, where only monitoring is costly. While monitoring
reduces bank profits and thus the dividend distributable to households, it simultaneously
raises the salary of the latter. Both banks and firms earn a positive monopolistic rent
in the steady state.
The stationary equilibrium has been computed for quarterly data at zero inflation. The
interest factors R, Rd, and Rl imply thus an annual real rate on risk-free bonds (the
policy rate), sight deposits, and loans of about 1.96%, 0.8%, and 4.6%. This corresponds
to a steady-state annual IMP of 1.16% and a steady-state annual EFP of 2.64%.
What I label premium is indeed the consequence of two special features of this model.
On the one hand, there is an intermediation cost in both the deposit and the loan market
that is passed on to clients. Private banks demand an interest rate above the risk-free rate
on working capital loans and pay an interest rate below R on deposit accounts. On the
other hand, imperfect competition among banks allows them to expand these interest
differentials. The monopolistic mark-ups or mark-downs in Rd and Rl, respectively,
generate positive steady-state profits.
Steady-State Values (benchmark calibration)
y c i k n s R Rd Rl
1.1252 0.8515 0.2724 10.8959 0.3314 0.0020 1.0049 1.0020 1.0115
w d m l g gf π IMP EFP
1.8274 0.6812 0.2637 0.8779 0.2372 0.0024 1.0000 0.0029 0.0066
Table 1: Steady-state results for a benchmark parameter calibration
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5.3 Comparative Statics
The steady-state values presented in table 1 primarily serve as a guideline for an ad-
equate calibration and lack illustrative power without further study. The question is
thus nearby, how long-run economic activity in this model depends on the extent of
competition among banks. For this purpose, I analyse the steady-state values of a few
selected variables with respect to the interest rate sensitivities ηd and ηl.
Figure 1 illustrates the long-run relation between economic activity and competition in
the market for deposits. Therein, I steadily increase the parameter of interest from 10,
i.e. few competitors, to 1000, approximating perfect competition among the providers
of deposits contracts. Obviously, output, investment and employment are negatively
correlated with bank market power. The higher ηd, i.e. the less sensitive the demand
for deposits of bank j to Rdt (j), the higher the mark-up demanded on top of marginal
costs and the IMP.
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Figure 1: Imperfect competition on the deposit market for values of ηd ∈ [10,1000]
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Figure 2: Imperfect competition in the market for loans, ηl ∈ [10,1000]
In the case of extremely low competition, the spread between the policy and the bank
rate climbs to a maximum of about 20 percentage points p.a.. The impact on economic
activity is important. It leads to a contraction relative to the benchmark steady state of
about 3.6% in each output, consumption, and employment. On the other hand, economic
activity expands by less than 0.1% in the absence of market power. This implies that my
benchmark calibration is not far from the case of perfect competition. Note that even
then, the IMP does not drop to zero, because banks still face positive costs of deposit
provision.
Accordingly, figure 2 illustrates the stationary levels of economic activity as a percentage
of the benchmark case for different levels of competition in the market for loans. When
I set ηl to 10, banks drive the EFP up to an annual value of more than 23 percentage
points.13 As a consequence, the steady state of output contracts by 8.75% relative to
13Some readers might doubt the empirical relevance of these interest differentials. However, lenders
in poorly developed financial markets with low competition are capable of demanding much higher
premiums, even in real terms.
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its benchmark value. Investment into productive capital and the amount of loans even
shrink by up to 13.2%. Again, the expansionary effect of an above-benchmark level
of competition is comparatively small, reaching values of 0.14% for output, and 0.21%
for investment and loans. Lower market power of lenders reduces the external finance
premium by only 30 basis points p.a..
In line with the first finding by van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008), imperfect competition
among financial intermediaries leads to increased spreads between bank rates and the
policy rate.14 By causing an under-provision of economic agents with liquidity and work-
ing capital loans, bank market power unambiguously harms long-run economic activity.
In an environment with monopolised markets for financial services, the model predicts a
drop in output, consumption, employment, and investment below their potential steady-
state equilibrium values.
6 Dynamic Analysis
In the following sections, the model is solved by numerical simulation. I examine whether
it is able to reproduce the empirically predicted impulse responses to standard exogenous
shocks. Further, I analyse how the level of competition among corporate banks affects
the transmission mechanism and thus the efficiency of monetary policy.
6.1 Remaining Parameters
When calibrating the model for the steady-state analysis, irrelevant parameters were left
open. On the one hand, this concerns the entire set of adjustment cost coefficients. Since
quadratic adjustment costs have the convenient trait of disappearing in the steady state,
their calibration has been postponed until now. The estimates in the related literature
for the capital adjustment cost coefficient φk range from 10 to 35, depending on the
respective model specifications and data sample period. Following Ireland (2003) who
receives a highly significant φk of 32.13 in a sticky price model for the post-1979 period,
I pick a value of 35. I further set the coefficient of price rigidity φp to 100, a value in the
mid range of Ireland’s estimates. Adjusting deposits is assumed to be slightly less costly
14The model fails to reproduce an inverse relation between loan market competition and the rate on
deposits.
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than adjusting a firm’s capital stock, i.e. φd = 30. Finally, there are two parameters left
for which I cannot resort to any conclusive empirical evidence.15 It seems acceptable to
assume that it is equally costly for a bank to change its interest rate as it is for a firm
to change its price. I therefore set both φRd and φRl to 100.
On the other hand, the Taylor rule must be specified numerically. It is characterised by
an exclusive reaction to deviations from the zero target inflation rate and by interest-
rate inertia. The central bank is averse to sudden jumps in the policy rate and places
a weight ρ = 0.75 on Rt−1. To satisfy the Taylor principle, the central bank must raise
the nominal interest rate by more than one percentage point for each percentage point
increase in inflation. In line with Taylor’s original proposal, I set ϕπ to 1.5.16
Finally, I calibrate the autoregressive coefficients and standard deviations of the four
shocks. Following Ireland (2003) and many others, I assume that these processes display
a significant persistence, with ρα = 0.88, ρθ = 0.95, ρχ = 0.9, and ρω = 0.9. For the
associated standard deviations of the i.i.d. disturbances, I choose σα = 0.6, σθ = 0.8,
σχ = 0.8, and σω = 0.18 in percentage terms. These parameters imply that technology
shocks in the banking and the goods-producing sector are similarly highly auto-correlated
and of same average magnitude.
The standard deviation of monetary policy shocks σr is set to 25 basis points on a
quarterly basis. This corresponds to an innovation in the policy rate of one percentage
point per annum. Table 2 provides an overview of the entire set of benchmark parameter
values.
6.2 Results
The dynamic system of equations is solved in Dynare on Matlab. The model contains
10 forward-looking endogenous variables, so-called jump variables. It must therefore
possess an identical number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle to fulfil the Blanchard-
Kahn conditions. As the solution algorithm requires linear equations, I loglinearise the
15Gerali et al. (2008) calibrate the adjustment cost coefficients for bank interest rates to 375 for loans
to firms, 500 for loans to households, and 1800 for deposits. In a more recent and extended version of
the paper, Gerali et al. (2009) estimate part of their model parameters, receiving posterior mean values
for the above coefficients of 14.1, 13.95 and 10.13, respectively, strongly opposing their reasoning when
calibrating the same parameters.
16Note that a calibration with ϕπ ≤ 1 does not satisfy the stability conditions for applying the solution
method proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). In this case, the equilibrium becomes indeterminate.
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model at the steady state. Appendix B contains the transformed system of equations.
The simulation results are presented in two steps, beginning with the impulse responses
of a selection of important variables to the model’s exogenous shocks. The subsequent
sensitivity analysis focuses on the importance of monopolistic competition among com-
mercial banks for the transmission of monetary policy.
6.2.1 Impulse Responses in the Benchmark Model
This section provides a survey of the model’s implications for the dynamic behaviour of
key economic variables. The corresponding impulse response functions are displayed at
the end of the paper.
Technology shock
Figure 5 maps the reaction of selected variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to
the technology parameter θ. It generates the empirically found hump-shaped responses
in output, consumption, and investment. Output takes two years before it peaks at
0.49 percent above its stationary equilibrium and starts to converge back. Restricted
by deposits which are costly to adjust, consumption reacts equally slowly. It reaches a
maximum percentage deviation from steady state of 0.47 after 2.5 years, only. Invest-
ment, on the contrary, responds much quicker and increases by more than 1.5 times this
fraction. As in the data, it displays thus the highest variability of the three. Due to
a strong rise in the real wage, employment in goods production falls on impact. Over
time, additional physical capital is accumulated and the growth in labour productivity
justifies the payment of a higher real wage.
The monetary authority responds to the slowdown in inflation by 0.093 percentage
points, and mechanically relaxes its policy. At the end of the first year, the quarterly
risk-free interest rate has fallen by 6.5 basis points. This corresponds to 0.26 percent on
an annual basis.
The technology shock spills over to the banking sector, as well. The immediate rise in
desired investment is financed through additional loans. Employment in the banking
sector increases, accordingly. While the direction of the overall changes in Rd and Rl is
predetermined by the policy rate, the effect of the exogenous shock is visible in the IMP
and EFP. With decreasing marginal productivity of monitoring effort, the expansion of
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loan production raises marginal costs. Thus, banks demand a higher premium on top of
the risk-free rate.
Although more deposits are required, as consumption rises with economic activity, banks
are able to provide them at a reduced cost. Their increased demand for high-powered
money m is amplified by the expansionary monetary policy. Temporarily, the inside
money premium falls by more than 1.3 basis points.
Monetary Policy shock
Next, I analyse a positive disturbance of 25 basis points to the Taylor rule, i.e. an
unforeseen increase in the annual policy rate by one percentage point. On the real side
of the economy, the standard qualitative effects are observed. A monetary tightening
leads to a drop in GDP, consumption, and investment by 0.21, 0.09, and 0.81 percent
relative to the steady state. Employment in both goods production and the banking
falls significantly (see figure 6).
At this point, the popular non-backward-looking character of firms’ optimal price setting
is somewhat unfortunate. Since the current period’s inflation rate πt is not predeter-
mined17, part of the monetary policy shock is absorbed by an instantaneous deceleration
of inflation. Yet, I would like to emphasise that the impact on the real interest rate is
the same, whether it originates from an increase in the nominal interest rate or from
reduced inflation.
Central bank measures are destined to influence the inflation rate or the level of activity
in an economy. It is thus of major interest, how a monetary contraction affects the
banking sector as the provider of inside money and working capital loans.
Obviously, bank interest rates increase by less than the policy rate. A slowdown in
economic activity lowers the demand for financial intermediation. Although liquidity
services d fade by 0.09 percent in line with consumption, the severe contraction in the
supply of high-powered money increases the costs of deposit provision. As a consequence,
banks demand a higher IMP and adjust the deposit interest rate imperfectly to the new
policy rate. At the same time, the demand for loans l falls by a full percent relative to
its steady-state. The loan interest rate differential EFP decreases by up to 3.65 basis
17Note that even if πt, the change in the price level between period t − 1 and t is not predetermined,
the previous period’s price level Pt−1 clearly is. Accordingly, the rate of inflation becomes a jump variable
through changes in the current period price level.
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points.
Deposit-in-Advance shock
The largest part of an increase in the minimum deposit requirement per unit of consump-
tion is compensated by an immediate waiving of household consumption. In response
to a rise in α, the latter falls by 0.52 percent relative to its stationary value. The ad-
justment of deposits is costly and satisfies the new constraint with a lag, only. The
drop in consumption generates a deceleration of inflation, illustrated in figure 7. As a
consequence, real labour costs rise and employment decreases by more than 0.6 percent
of its steady state. The delayed increase in investment by barely 0.04 percent is not
sufficient to prevent the downturn in GDP.
The central bank reacts to the slowdown of inflation by easing monetary policy. While
the interest rate on loans follows R closely, the deposit rate falls by somewhat less.
The demand for loans drops by 0.38 percent. Therefore, banks require less monitoring.
These redundancies in the banking sector are amplified by the steady increase in firms’
productive capital stock and thus collateral. As a result, the EFP remains below its
steady state during convergence.
Similar to the case of a positive technology shock, the spread between Rd and the policy
rate does not rise in response to a tightening of the DIA constraint. With high-powered
money reserves increasing by 0.9 percent in the first and another 0.4 percent in the
second and third quarter, commercial banks can even provide deposit accounts at a
slightly reduced cost. They demand thus a lower IMP.
Inside-Money-Premium shock
The two remaining exogenous disturbances originate directly from the banking sector.
They are expected to have minor influence on the real economy. The impulse responses
of selected variables to an increase in ω, which makes the provision of deposits more
costly, are depicted in figure 8. Commercial banks react by accumulating larger reserves
of high-powered money. This limits the rise in costs and has a moderating effect on the
IMP. Accordingly, the interest rate on deposit accounts decreases by a mere 0.015 basis
points relative to the steady state.
Nevertheless, any fall in Rd corresponds to an increase in the liquidity cost of con-
sumption. Households thus reduce their consumption expenditure and deposit holdings;
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however, by an insignificant amount. This lower level implies a higher marginal utility
of consumption and, from the loglinearised equation (B.2), a fall in the real wage w.
Consequently, the simulation predicts a slight expansive effect on output, employment
in goods production and banking, as well as inflation, while firms invest less. Following
the Taylor rule, the monetary authority counteracts any inflation by raising the policy
rate. Note that all deviations in the impulse responses of real variables are of the order
10−4 or minor.
External-Finance-Premium shock
Finally, I expose the model to a positive technology shock in bank monitoring of size σχ.
As expected, increased efficiency in loan production makes part of the financial sector
employees redundant - s falls by 0.79 percent. Still, credit contracts can be provided at
a lower cost. This is passed on to clients as a reduction in the EFP by 0.38 basis points
and a comparable drop in the quarterly loan interest rate Rl, illustrated in figure 9.
Goods producers benefit from this cheaper source of funds. They borrow additional
working capital to expand employment and investment by up to 0.28 and 0.6 basis
points, respectively. It is due to the increased labour demand that firm output grows
by 0.19 basis points during the first year. The faster accumulation of capital affects
production capacity with a lag, only.
With regard to the lower borrowing costs of firms, a rise in the productivity of monitoring
is comparable to a positive supply shock. It generates a small immediate slowdown in
inflation. The monetary authority follows its Taylor rule and lowers the policy rate by a
maximum of 2⋅10−4 percentage points, after one year. This suffices to ensure convergence.
The deposit rate follows closely, diverging merely by a negligible fluctuation in the IMP.
The quantitative analysis of impulse responses suggests that the contribution of distur-
bances emerging from financial intermediation to the business cycle is of second order
importance. The present model contains two such shocks – one impeding the provision
of deposit accounts and one varying the efficiency in loan production. By influencing the
spreads between the deposit rate and the risk-free interest rate, and between the loan
interest rate and R, these shocks have an impact on agents’ optimal decision making.
Both affect output, consumption, investment, and the like through a bank interest rate
channel.
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6.2.2 Monetary Policy and Financial Intermediation
This paper’s key question is whether and to what extent the pass-through from changes
in the policy rate to the real economy depends on the degree of competition in the
banking sector. In the light of recent central bank behaviour, the subsequent sensitivity
analyses focus on the impulse responses of a selection of variables to an expansive mon-
etary policy shock.
The Impact of Competition in the Market for Deposits
The novelty in my model with respect to the underlying work by Goodfriend and McCal-
lum (2007) is the fact that commercial banks enjoy a quantifiable interest rate setting
power.
In the following analysis, I set the interest elasticity of demand for deposit contracts
provided by a certain bank, ηd, to 9, 500, and 1 ⋅ 1012. These values characterise a
situation with highly monopolistic banks, the benchmark case, and perfect competition
in the market for deposits. All three are solved numerically, i.e. simulated for 2000
periods, in order to extract so-called policy and transmission functions as well as first
and second order moments of the model’s endogenous variables. A selection of the
impulse responses for the first 20 periods succeeding an expansionary monetary policy
shock is presented in figure 3. While an interest rate mark-down of 12.5% on deposits
seems quite high, I choose this value to exhaust the potential relevance of ηd for the
transmission mechanism.
As expected, the stock of high-powered money soars directly after the drop in the pol-
icy rate. However, the extent of this increase is insensitive to the parameter under
consideration. I thus focus on the impulse responses of Rd and the corresponding inter-
est differential. With perfect competition, any variation in the IMP is entirely due to
fluctuations in the endogenous costs of deposit provision. For the benchmark calibra-
tion ηd=500, demand for bank deposits is still elastic enough to trace the previous case
closely. If, however, the market for deposits displays an oligopolistic structure, so that
agents profit from considerable interest rate setting power, the IMP drops in response
to the expansive monetary shock. Private banks find it optimal to adjust their deposit
rate with a lag and only by one quarter of the percentage point revision we observe in a
perfectly competitive market.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a monetary policy innovation for ηd = 9, 500, and 1 ⋅1012
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Nevertheless, the effect on consumption and deposits is remarkable only in the first two
years. The percentage deviation from steady state in the minimum competition scenario
exceeds that in the perfect competition case by up to six percent. Incomplete pass-
through from monetary policy to the bank interest rate leads to a stronger reduction
in the opportunity cost of deposit-secured consumption – the IMP. It is thus optimal
for the representative household to adjust consumption by more, ceteris paribus, the
higher the market power of banks. The same is observable in the reactions of GDP and
employment to an innovation in the policy rate. Yet, the effect is hard to recognise, even
for a very low degree of interest-rate elasticity.
It seems to be optimal for commercial banks to exploit their interest rate setting power.
While the adjustment of consumption is sensitive to ηd, the difference in output and
employment is below one basis point and barely visible, unless impulse responses are
magnified. Nevertheless, we can state that limited competition in the market for deposits
amplifies the expansion of real economic activity after a surprise drop in the monetary
policy rate.
Varying the Degree of Monopolistic Competition in the Loan Market
The final sensitivity analysis examines the role of monopolistic competition in the market
for loans. Again, I choose three values for parameter ηl that characterise very low,
benchmark, and – at least approximately – infinitely high substitutability between the
credit contracts supplied by different banks. I therefore pick values of 9, 400, and 1 ⋅1012.
Surprisingly, the structural composition of the loan market has a much stronger influence
on the economy’s real side than that of the market for deposits. After an unanticipated
monetary expansion, commercial banks naturally lower their loan rate. Yet, how closely
they follow the policy rate, depends on two aspects: On the one hand, a falling real
wage rate and a reduced need for monitoring effort – due to the drop in loan demand
– lower the cost of loan production. On the other hand, monopolistically competitive
banks consider market share effects and adjustment costs in their interest rate setting.
By definition, the negative correlation between loan demand and the loan interest rate
weakens with ηl. Imperfectly competitive banks exploit their interest rate setting power
and accept a temporary surge in the EFP relative to the perfect competition scenario.
If I set the interest sensitivity to an extremely low value, the model predicts a maximum
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reduction in Rl by 4.6 basis points, opposed by nearly 20 basis points when ηl → ∞.
This corresponds to a percentage deviation from steady state four times as large. Even
when the parameter takes its benchmark value, profit maximisation still invites banks
to adjust their loan interest rate incompletely in response to a drop in R, allowing for a
transitory increase in the EFP.
According to the model, endowing private banks with market power significantly atten-
uates the pass-through of monetary policy shocks. I already remarked that the role of
competition in the loan market dwarfs the effect of competition among deposit providers.
In absolute terms, the instantaneous impulse responses of output and employment for
ηl = 9 and ηl →∞ differ by approximately 4.6 and 7 basis point; that of loans by up to
12 basis points. In line with the empirical evidence, investment into productive capital
displays the highest interest sensitivity among the real variables. On impact, its devia-
tions from the steady state reach from +0.66 to +0.85 percent – a difference of almost
30 percent.
The preceding sensitivity analysis unambiguously attests that monopolistic competition
in the loan market can be a significant bottleneck for monetary policy. In this respect,
the model matches the empirical evidence of van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) who consider
only loan market competition. The pass-through from policy and thus market rates to
bank interest rates is weaker in less competitive markets. Banks as interest-rate makers
cushion thus the deviation of real variables from steady state.
This result has an important implication in the light of the currently observed credit
crunch. Although central banks worldwide pursued an expansive monetary policy of
unprecedented determination18, private banks failed to fully pass this reduction in the
key interest rate on to borrowers. As a consequence, the shortage in loan supply, a
major threat, especially to small and medium-sized firms which are unable to refinance
themselves through the stock market, persists to this day. While it is not certain, to
what extent the assessed imperfect pass-through reflects the risk considerations of inter-
mediaries, delayed and incomplete adjustment of bank rates to the policy rate strongly
indicates the existence of interest rate setting power.
18Between October 2008 and May 2009, the European Central Bank has reduced the interest rate on
main refinancing operations by 325 basis points from a level of 4.25% to currently 1.00%.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for ηl = 9, 400, and 1 ⋅ 1012
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7 Conclusion
In the model presented here, private agents rely on two types of financial services. These
deposits and loans are provided by commercial banks. The costs of financial interme-
diation determine most of the spread between the risk-free refinancing rate and bank
rates, the so-called inside money and external finance premium, respectively. More im-
portantly, the services of different banks substitute imperfectly against each other. Mo-
nopolistic competition in deposit and loan markets implies that banks enjoy an interest
rate setting power through their influence on the IMP and EFP.
The results suggest that innovations inherent to the banking sector are relatively unim-
portant in comparison to the three standard shocks. Yet, my framework is not flexible
enough to simulate a severe financial crisis like the present credit crunch, which might
change theoretical predictions. This seems an interesting direction for further model
extensions.
The concluding sensitivity analysis compares the impulse responses of selected variables
to an unforeseen monetary expansion. It evaluates the importance of competition in bank
product markets for the pass-through of monetary policy. Imperfect competition among
the providers of deposits acts as a financial accelerator, in this model. By contrast,
credit contract heterogeneity absorbs part of the effect of monetary policy shocks.
While the degree of competition in the deposit market has merely marginal influence,
the interest sensitivity of loan demand not only dominates the former, but is clearly
quantitatively important for the behaviour of economic agents.
32
Appendix A. The Symmetric Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is an infinite time series of the 23 endogenous variables y, c, i,
k, n, s, w, g, gf , R, Rd, Rl, m, d, l, π, gcb, b, λ, ξ, Ξ, λ1, and λ2 given the exogenous shock
processes α, θ, ω, χ, and r, that solves the following system of 23 equilibrium conditions:
1
ct
= λt + ξtαt (A.1)
φ = λtwt (A.2)
λt = βEtλt+1 Rt
πt+1
(A.3)
βEtλt+1
Rdt
πt+1
+ ξt
= (1 + φd ( dt
dt−1
− 1))λt + βEtλt+1 [φd (d2t+1
d2t
− dt+1
dt
) − φd
2
(dt+1
dt
− 1)2] (A.4)
αtct = dt (A.5)
kt = (1 − δ)kt−1 + it (A.6)
yt = eθtkγt−1n1−γt (A.7)
βEt
λt+1
πt+1
Rltwtnt = (1 − γ)Ξtyt (A.8)
(1 − μ)λt + μΞt + μλtφp2 (πtπ − 1)
2 = λtφp (π2t
π2
− πt+1
π
) yt+1
yt
(A.9)
β2Et
λt+2
πt+2
(1 − δ)Rlt+1 − βEtλt+1πt+1Rlt + βγEtΞt+1
yt+1
kt
= λtφk ( kt
kt−1
− 1) − βEtλt+1φk (k2t+1
k2t
− kt+1
kt
) + βEtλt+1φk2 (kt+1kt − 1)
2
(A.10)
gt = yt − Rlt−1(wt−1nt−1 + it−1)
πt
− φp
2
(πt
π
− 1)2 − φk
2
( kt
kt−1
− 1)2 kt−1 (A.11)
Rt = (1 − ρ)(β−1 +ϕπ(πt − 1)) + ρRt−1 + Rt (A.12)
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gcbt =mt + bt−1Rt−1πt − bt −
mt−1
πt
(A.13)
mt = bt (A.14)
gft = dt + bt + mt−1πt +
lt−1R
l
t−1
πt
− dt−1Rdt−1
πt
− lt −mt −wtst − ωtdt
mt
− φRd
2
( Rdt
Rdt−1
− 1)2 dt − φRl2 ( R
l
t
Rlt−1
− 1)2 lt (A.15)
Et
β
πt+1
λt+1
λt
(Rt −Rdt ) = ωtmt −
λlt
λt
+ φRd
2
( Rdt
Rdt−1
− 1)2 (A.16)
Et
β
πt+1
λt+1
λt
(Rlt −Rt) = wtst(1 − σ)lt −
λ2t
λt
+ φRd
2
( Rlt
Rlt−1
− 1)2 (A.17)
Et
β
πt+1
λt+1
λt
(Rt − 1) = ωtdt
m2t
(A.18)
ηddt − βEtλt+1
λt
(1 + ηd) dt
πt+1
Rdt − ηdωtdtmt + βEt
λt+1
λt
φRd
⎛⎝R
d2
t+1
Rd
2
t
− Rdt+1
Rdt
⎞⎠dt+1
= φRd ⎛⎝ R
d2
t
Rd
2
t−1
− Rdt
Rdt−1
⎞⎠dt + ηdφRd2 ( R
d
t
Rdt−1
− 1)2 dt + λlt
λt
ηddt (A.19)
ηllt + βEtλt+1
λt
(1 − ηl) lt
πt+1
Rlt + βEtλt+1λt φRl
⎛⎝R
l2
t+1
Rl
2
t
− Rlt+1
Rlt
⎞⎠ lt+1
= φRl ⎛⎝ R
l2
t
Rl
2
t−1
− Rlt
Rlt−1
⎞⎠ lt − ηlφRl2 ( R
l
t
Rlt−1
− 1)2 lt − λ2t
λt
ηllt (A.20)
lt = wtnt + it (A.21)
lt = F (gt + qkt)σ(eχtst)1−σ (A.22)
ct + dt + φd2 ( dtdt−1 − 1)
2
dd−1 = wt(nt + st) + dt−1Rdt−1
πt
+ gt + gft + gcbt (A.23)
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Appendix B. The Model in Loglinear Form
Below, xˆt stands for the percentage deviation of variable x from its stationary equilib-
rium in period t. Note that the denotations of Rˆt, Rˆ
d
t , and Rˆ
l
t have a slightly different
meaning: The interest rates on risk-free bonds, deposits, and loans enter the loglinear
system in terms of absolute deviation from steady states measured in percentage or basis
points, respectively.
0 = (1
c
) cˆt + λλˆt + ξαξˆt + αξαˆt (B.1)
0 = wˆt + λˆt (B.2)
0 = dˆt − cˆt − αˆt (B.3)
0 = kˆt − (1 − δ)kˆt−1 − δiˆt (B.4)
0 = γkˆt−1 + (1 − γ)nˆt − yˆt + θˆt (B.5)
0 = yyˆt − wn + i
π
Rˆlt−1 − Rlwnπ (wˆt−1 + nˆt−1) − R
li
π
iˆt−1 − Rl(wn + i)
π
πˆt − ggˆt (B.6)
0 = ddˆt + bbˆt + m
π
(mˆt−1 − πˆt) + l
π
Rˆlt−1 + lRlπ (lˆt−1 − πˆt) − dπ Rˆdt−1 − dR
d
π
(dˆt−1 − πˆt)
− b
π
Rˆt−1 − bR
π
(bˆt−1 − πˆt) − llˆt −mmˆt −ws(wˆt + sˆt) − ωd
m
(ωˆt + dˆt − mˆt) − gf gˆft (B.7)
0 = −Rˆt + ρRˆt−1 + (1 − ρ)ϕπππˆt + rt (B.8)
0 = mˆt − bˆt (B.9)
0 =mmˆt + b
π
Rˆt−1 + bR
π
(bˆt−1 − πˆt) − bbˆt − m
π
(mˆt−1 − πˆt) − gcbgˆcbt (B.10)
0 = wn(wˆt + nˆt) + iˆit − llˆt (B.11)
0 = σqk
g + qk kˆt + (1 − σ)sˆt − lˆt + σgg + qk gˆt + (1 − σ)χˆt (B.12)
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0 = ccˆt + ddˆt −wn(wˆt + nˆt) −ws(wˆt + sˆt)
− d
π
Rˆdt−1 − Rddπ (dˆt−1 − πˆt) − ggˆt − gf gˆft − gcbgˆcbt (B.13)
0 = βRˆt −Etπˆt+1 +Etλˆt+1 − λˆ (B.14)
0 = βφdEtdˆt+1 − (1 + β)φddˆt + φddˆt−1 + β 1
π
Rˆdt − βRdπ Etπˆt+1 + βR
d
π
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + ξ
λ
ξˆt (B.15)
0 = (1 − μ)λˆt + (μ − 1)Ξˆt − φpπˆt + βφpEtπˆt+1 (B.16)
0 = Rˆlt +Et(λˆt+1 − πˆt+1) + wˆt + nˆt − Ξˆt − yˆt (B.17)
0 = βφkEtkˆt+1 − [(1 + β)φk + βγΞ
λ
y
k
] kˆt + φkkˆt−1 + β2 1 − δ
π
RlEt(λˆt+2 − πˆt+2)
+ βγΞ
λ
y
k
Etyˆt+1 − βRl
π
Et(λˆt+1 − πˆt+1) + βγΞ
λ
y
k
EtΞˆt+1 + β2
π
(1 − δ)Rˆlt+1 − βπ Rˆlt (B.18)
0 = β
π
(Rˆt − Rˆdt ) − βπ (R −Rd)Et(πˆt+1 − λˆt+1 + λˆt) − ωm(ωˆt − mˆt) + λ
l
λ
(λˆlt − λˆt) (B.19)
0 = β
π
(Rˆlt − Rˆt) − βπ (Rl −R)Et(πˆt+1 − λˆt+1 + λˆt) − ws(1 − σ)l(wˆt + sˆt − lˆt) + λ
2
λ
(λˆ2t − λˆt)
(B.20)
0 = β
π
Rˆt − β
π
(R − 1)Et(πˆt+1 − λˆt+1 + λˆt) − ωd
m2
(ωˆt + dˆt − 2mˆt) (B.21)
0 = βφRd
Rd
EtRˆ
d
t+1 + [ηd (1 − ωm) − βπ (1 + ηd)Rd] dˆt − [(1 + β)φRdRd + βπ (1 + ηd)] Rˆdt + φRdRd Rˆdt−1
+ ηd ω
m
(mˆt − ωˆt) + β
π
(1 + ηd)RdEt(πˆt+1 − λˆt+1 + λˆt) − ηdλl
λ
(λˆlt + dˆt − λˆt) (B.22)
0 = βφRl
Rl
EtRˆ
l
t+1 + [ηl + βπ (1 − ηl)Rl] lˆt + [βπ (1 − ηl) − (1 + β)φRlRl ] Rˆlt
+ φRl
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Completive Tables and Figures
Parameter Values (benchmark calibration)
Coefficient Value Coefficient Value
α 0.8 φd 30
β 0.9951 φRd 100
γ 0.35 φRl 100
δ 0.025 ρ 0.75
φ 2.141 φπ 1.5
ω 0.0005 σr 0.25
σ 0.6 ρθ 0.95
F 6 σθ 0.80
q 0.21 ρα 0.88
μ 6 σα 0.60
ηd 500 ρω 0.90
ηl 400 σω 0.18
φk 35 ρχ 0.90
φp 100 σχ 0.80
Table 2: Benchmark calibration of all model parameters relevant for the economy’s
steady state and dynamic behaviour
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Figure 5: Selected impulse responses to an orthogonalised technology shock εθt in goods
production
41
10 20 30 40
−0.4
−0.2
0
y
10 20 30 40
−0.1
−0.05
0
c
10 20 30 40
−1
−0.5
0
i
10 20 30 40
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
k
10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
n
10 20 30 40
−4
−2
0
2
s
10 20 30 40
−1
−0.5
0
w
10 20 30 40
−2
0
2
g
10 20 30 40
−200
0
200
400
gf
10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
R
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
Rd
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
Rl
10 20 30 40
−30
−20
−10
0
m
10 20 30 40
−0.1
−0.05
0
d
10 20 30 40
−1
−0.5
0
l
10 20 30 40
−0.2
0
0.2
pi
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
imp
10 20 30 40
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
efp
Figure 6: Selected impulse responses to an isolated shock εrt to the monetary policy
rate
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Figure 7: Selected impulse responses to an orthogonalised Deposit-in-Advance distur-
bance εαt
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Figure 8: Selected impulse responses to an orthogonalised Inside Money Premium
shock εωt
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Figure 9: Selected impulse responses to an isolated shock εχt to the External Finance
Premium
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